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ABSTRACT
Studies in fields like psychology and sociology have revealed that
reciprocity is a powerful determinant of human behavior. None
of the existing access control models however captures this reci-
procity phenomenon. In this paper, we introduce a new kind of
grant, which we call mutual, to express authorizations that actu-
ally do this, i.e., users grant access to their resources only to users
who allow them access to theirs. We define the syntax and seman-
tics of mutual authorizations and show how this new grant can
be included in the Role-Based Access Control model, i.e., extend
RBAC with it. We use location-based services as an example to
deploy mutual authorizations, and we propose two approaches to
integrate them into these services. Next, we prove the soundness
and analyze the complexity of both approaches. We also study how
the ratio of mutual to allow and to deny authorizations affects the
number of persons whose position a given person may read. These
ratios may help in predicting whether users are willing to use mu-
tual authorizations instead of deny or allow. Experiments confirm
our complexity analysis and shed light on the performance of our
approaches.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Access control; Authorization.
KEYWORDS
access control models, reciprocity, mutual authorizations
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Protecting information from unauthorized access is important to
guarantee data confidentiality. Access policies state who may ac-
cess which resource. Such policies are often implemented using
authorizations of a specific access control model. Various models
have been proposed; a prominent, mature one is Role-based Access
Control (RBAC) [20].
Traditional access policies are designed to fulfill the needs of
an organization or the individual needs of the users of a system.
When, however, users decide who may access their resources, social
factors and human behavior are significant. An important trend
in psychology, economics, and sociology is reciprocity. Studies
[6, 7, 24] have revealed that, although humans are self-interested,
they often deviate from this attitude reciprocally. Reciprocity means
that, in response to friendly actions, people are more cooperative.
Reciprocity comes into play with access control when persons grant
access to their resources to users that allow them the same. Think
of a bike sharing system: It is more natural for a user to allow usage
of his bike to others who allow him using theirs.
Example 1.1. Considering a bike sharing system, think of two
users Anne and Bob who own bikes bikeA and bikeB, respectively.
Anne wants to let Bob locate and use bikeA only if Bob allows her
to locate and use bikeB. With conventional access control models,
Anne can check whether Bob has allowed her this and then set her
access privileges for him accordingly.
Example 1.2. Think of a population consisting of Anne, who
again owns bikeA, and 10, 000 other individuals, each one owning
another bike. Anne now wants to allow any other individual I to
locate and use bikeA iff I allows her to locate and use his/her bike.
With conventional models, Anne would have to repeat the proce-
dure from Example 1.1 10, 000 times. This also requires privileges
to be public, which is unrealistic because they are sensitive infor-
mation. Next, Anne would have to watch out for changes in the
access policies of others continuously, e.g., Anne would have to
revoke the access to any I as soon as I revokes her access to his
bike. With the reciprocity feature envisioned in turn, all that Anne
has to do is to specify one authorization.
Existing access control models do not explicitly support reci-
procity. Although there exist various models [16, 20, 25], they all
consider only two kinds of grants, allow and deny. But for reci-
procity, a new kind of grant is needed. We call it mutual and autho-
rizations that make use of it mutual authorizations.
Depending on the domain, access control models can protect
different resources. Think of location-based services (LBS). Here,
protecting the physical position of the users is crucial. They can be
used to infer other personal information such as political affiliations,
state of health or personal preferences [1]. Users often are unwilling
to share their position with all users in the system. But it is natural
to share it with users willing to share theirs.
Example 1.3. Continuing Example 1.2, one would expect Anne
to allow using bikeA to her father unconditionally. However, this
does not hold for all other individuals. Anne is more likely to allow
others using her bike if she gets something in return. In the first
case, allow authorizations are sufficient. In the second case however,
mutual authorizations are needed.
Such reciprocal sharing also makes sense with health informa-
tion or web-browsing histories (i.e., "I let you see my health record
if I can see yours."), to give further examples.
This paper defines the syntax and semantics of mutual autho-
rizations. One can then add these new authorizations to any ex-
isting access control model. Because of the importance of RBAC,
we select this model to study and illustrate how this addition can
look like conceptually. We use LBSs as a running example to de-
ploy mutual authorizations. Specifically, we consider two types of
location-dependent queries, k-nearest neighbor queries, and range
queries.
1.2 Challenges
Defining the syntax and semantics of mutual authorizations is
subject to several challenges. First, the entire semantic of autho-
rization has to be redefined to incorporate a new grant to support
reciprocity; however, especially for mutual authorizations, the se-
mantic is not trivial. While implementations of mutuality exist, we
are not aware of any integration in an access-control context.
Example 1.4. Consider a social network (SN). To befriend Bob,
Anne has to send him a friend request. If Bob accepts, they are
now friends. Such requests represent some concepts of mutuality.
However, controlling access to resources is only done by means
of allow and deny. For instance, Anne can only allow or deny her
friends to see her photos.
For a general extension, one needs a general model that sub-
sumes the existing ones. Since such a general model does not exist,
we propose one. A second challenge is the complexity of the com-
putations required to give access to a resource. In models with only
allow and deny, to determine who can access the resources of a user
u, it is enough to know all authorizations that u has specified. With
mutual authorizations however, this is not the case. Namely, one
also must know all authorizations assigned to u.
Regardless of the grants, the third challenge is the integration of
services (LBS in our example) with access policies. This includes
that (1) existing implementations are kept, and (2) solutions are
efficient. The result of a given service in the presence of authoriza-
tions is not obvious a priori. Namely, it is necessary to verify the
authorizations and to determine whether a given user should get
access to the resources required for the service. This integration is
needed because in order to guarantee data confidentiality.
Example 1.5. Think of a LBS provider (LBSP). A user has issued
a location-dependent query that the LBSP now executes, knowing
the position of the user. How can the LBSP take in authorizations to
answer location-dependent queries? The result of that query is the
set of persons who fulfill the query constraint, and whose positions
the querying user may see. Alternative designs of this integration
are conceivable. In particular, one may (1) execute the query first
and then filter the result based on the authorizations, or (2) first
compute the set of positions that the querying user may see, called
view of the user, and then execute the query on this view. Deciding
which alternative is better is not trivial.
One must also guarantee the soundness of such an integration,
i.e., correctness and completeness. Intuitively, the integration is
complete if all persons who satisfy the query constraints and whose
information the querying user may see are part of the result. The
integration is correct if the users in the result satisfy the query
constraints, and the querying user is allowed to see their informa-
tion. We formalize these properties in Section 2.6. Since there is
more than one way to integrate mutual authorizations into a given
service, the processing of a given query is unclear as well.
Lastly, it is not clear how the ratio of mutual to allow and deny
authorizations affect the size of the views of the users. This ratio is
important to predict whether users may be willing to use mutual
authorizations instead of deny or allow.
Example 1.6. Consider three users, Anne, Bob, and Carol who
have assigned deny authorizations to each other, i.e., the size of the
view of each user is zero. Now suppose that (1) Anne replaces her
deny authorization assigned to Bob with a mutual one, and (2) so
does Carol with Anne. Although the share of mutual authorizations
has increased, the size of the view of each user is still zero.
Example 1.7. Suppose that, given percentages of allow and deny
authorizations of the entire population, the probability Ps that a
user s , chosen at random, can see the positions of 10 percent of
the population is 0.4. Assume further that, if 10 percent of deny
authorizations are replaced by mutual, Ps increases to 0.8. Then it
is likely that users start considering using mutual authorizations
instead of deny because only 10 percent of deny authorizations
need to be replaced by mutual ones to double Ps . However, the
opposite might happen if 90 percent were needed.
Though we expect the number of persons whose information
one may read to increase if deny authorizations are replaced by
mutual etc., the extent is unclear. It is challenging to compute it,
based on the share of mutual to deny and allow authorizations.
1.3 Contributions
We start by introducing a conceptual structure of authorizations,
which we use to describe existing access control models. We then
present a new kind of grant, called mutual. It allows to model re-
ciprocal behavior. We define the syntax and semantics of mutual
authorizations and show how to include them into RBAC concep-
tually, i.e., extend RBAC with it. As a use case for the deployment,
we use LBSs, i.e., the two types of queries mentioned earlier. Their
semantics is well-defined, in contrast to, say, similarity queries for
health records. In a general setting, where resources have a different
degree of sensitivity, deciding whether an exchange of information
is fair may be difficult.
Example 1.8. Anne may not find it fair to open her health record
if she has a stigmatizing disease in exchange for looking at the
record of Bob who is in perfect health.
Covering the specifics of such other use cases is beyond the scope
of this current article. However, Section 7 does feature a checklist
of steps that one would have to carry out to this end.
To integratemutual authorizations into LBSs, we propose two ap-
proaches, called filtering-querying and querying-filtering. We prove
that both approaches are correct and complete. We also conduct
complexity analyses of them, to determine under which conditions
each approach performs better. The analysis shows that there is
no clear winner because the outcome depends on the query con-
straints, the size of the data set and the view size of the querying
user. But if one knows these parameters, our model can say which
approach is better. Next, we analyze how the difference in the ratio
of mutual to deny and allow authorizations affects the the view
size of a user. Finally, we conduct experiments to validate our com-
plexity analysis and to evaluate the performance of our approaches.
Next to other insights, our complexity analysis is a good estimation
of the behavior of our algorithms.
2 OUR AUTHORIZATION MODEL
Access control models have been studied widely, and several models
have been proposed [16, 20]. Each model has its own syntax and
semantics. The authorizations supported by these models allow
assessing their expressiveness [2]. The following is a conceptual
structure of authorizations which subsumes existing work.
2.1 A Conceptual Structure of Authorizations
We first introduce the elements of our structure.
• Person. Persons are individuals, together with attributes,
e.g., name, role. AttrPerson is the set of these attributes. At-
tributes are not atomic, especially, their value is a non-empty
set of atomic values. From the point of view of an authoriza-
tion, we see two types of persons: users and subjects.
• User. A user u is a person who assigns an authorization.U
denotes the set of all users.
• Subject. A subject s is a person who receives an autho-
rization. A single authorization can have multiple subjects.
So-called person constraints specify the subjects of an au-
thorization. A person constraint ConsPerson has the syntax:
ConsPerson = ConsPerson ∧ConsPerson |Attp = value |Attp ≥
value |Attp ≤ value, where Attp refers to an attribute in
AttrPerson, and value refers to an atomic value. SinceAttp is
not atomic, for a given person s , the expressionAttp (=|≥|≤
) value resolves to ∃x ∈ s .Attp,x (=|≥|≤) value , where
s .Attp denotes the set of atomic values of the attributeAttp
for s . S is the set of all subjects. Given a person constraint
ConsPerson, the induced set of subjects contains all persons
s ∈ S that fulfill ConsPerson. For instance, the set of subjects
induced by aдe < 20 ∧ income < 20k contains all persons
s ∈ S whose age is smaller than 20 and their income is less
than 20k.
• Resource. A resource res is a physical or informational unit,
together with attributes, e.g., type, owned by a user u for
which u controls access. AttrResource stands for the attributes
of the resources. Attributes are not atomic, especially, their
value is a non-empty set of atomic values. So-called resource
constraints specify the resources of an authorization. A re-
source constraint ConsResource has the syntax: ConsResource =
ConsResource∧ConsResource | Attr = value | Attr≥value |
Attr≤value, whereAttr is an attribute in AttrResource, and
and value refers to an atomic value. SinceAttr is not atomic,
for a given resource res , the expression Attr (=|≥|≤) value
resolves to ∃x ∈ res .Attr ,x (=|≥|≤) value , where res .Attr
denotes the set of atomic values of the attribute Attr for
res . — In general, resources have to be classified by sensi-
tivity levels. However, if not stated differently, this article
assumes the same sensitivity level of all resources. Next, to
ease presentation, we assume that all resources are of the
same type. Dealing with resources of a different type, e.g.,
entire browsing history vs. history of today in that other
example, is future work. On the other side, one can formu-
late sophisticated policies, which, say, discern between my
position during the workday and during evenings, within
our conceptual structure, using resource attributes.
• Operation. An operation op is an action that one can invoke
on a resource, e.g., read or write. Op denotes the set of all
operations.
• Grant. A grant дr is a right to execute an operation. Gr
denotes the set of all grants.
• Time. A time t is an interval of time [ti , tf ] during which
an authorization is valid, where ti and tf are the initial and
final time, respectively. If an authorization is valid from the
time it is entered in the system until the time it is deleted
from the system, we write [0,∞].
Definition 2.1 (Authorization). Let a user u ∈ U , a person con-
straint ConsPerson, a resource constraint ConsResource, an operation
op ∈ Op, a grant дr ∈ Gr and a time t be given. An authorization
A is a 6-element tuple ⟨ u,ConsPerson ,ConsResource,op,дr , [ti , tf ] ⟩.
The authorizationA indicates that user u assigns the grant дr to the
subjects specified by ConsPerson to invoke the operation op on the
resources specified by ConsResource. A is valid during the interval
of time [ti , tf ]. — We call the set of all authorizations A . Given an
authorization A, we say that user (A) assigns A to subjects(A), and
subjects(A) receive authorization A from user (A).
We assume that resources always have an attribute owner, i.e.,
owner ∈ ResAtt, and only the owners can write authorizations to
control access to their resources. However, for brevity, (1) we omit
the attribute owner from the set of resource attributes, and (2) given
an authorization A assigned by a user u, we do not explicitly write
the resource constraint owner=u, but we assume it to be present.
Example 2.2 illustrates how to express an authorization, Defini-
tion 2.1.
Example 2.2. Let us consider a user Ana who wants to allow
read access to her file File1 to all persons with the role of Cashier.
Let us call this authorization AAna . AAna can be expressed us-
ing our conceptual structure as follows: AAna = ⟨ Ana, role =
Cashier,name = File1, read,allow, [0,∞] ⟩, where role is a person
attribute in PersonAtt , name is a resource attribute inAttrResource ,
read is an operation in Op, allow is a grant in Gr , and [0,∞] indi-
cates that AAna is valid from the time it is entered in the system
until it is deleted from the system.
We now introduce further notation: subjects(A), res(A),op(A) and
grant(A) denote, respectively, the subjects induced by ConsPerson of
A, the resources induced by ConsResource of A, the operation op of
A, and the grant дr of A.
2.2 Existing access control models
We now use our conceptual structure of authorization, Defini-
tion 2.1, to describe existing access control models. The Role-Based
Access Control Model, RBAC, is one of the most prominent models
in the area [5, 9]. In RBAC, roles and authorizations regulate access
to resources [20]. Each role is mapped to a set of authorizations
and each subject in the system is assigned to a set of roles. Another
popular access control model is discretionary access control. In
this model the owner of a resource decides who can access the
resource [17]. RBAC can be configured to support discretionary ac-
cess control authorizations, [17]. In RBACwith discretionary access
control, using our conceptual structure of authorization, the set of
person attributes is AttrPerson = {role,name}. Depending on the
organizations needs, it is possible to consider different resource
attributes, AttrResource , and set of operations, Op. For instance,
AttrResource = {type}, where type specifies the type of resource,
e.g., printer or file, and Op = {read,write}. The set of grants in
RBAC is Gr = {allow,deny}. RBAC does not specify an interval
of time during which an authorization is valid, so the valid inter-
val of time of an authorization is [0,∞]. Example 2.2 illustrates an
authorization in RBAC. A Task Role-Based Access Control Model,
TRBAC, was proposed in [16]. The authors consider a task as a
fundamental unit of a business activity and they emphasize that
tasks and roles are different concepts. Although a role contains
a set of tasks, a role can have mutually exclusive tasks which re-
quire access to different resources. In TRBAC, each role contains
a set of tasks. Roles are assigned to subjects. Subjects can be as-
signed any task that belongs to one of their roles. Authorizations
are modeled based on the tasks and roles of the subjects. With our
conceptual structure of authorization, the set of person attributes
in TRBAC is AttrPerson = {role, task}. Similar to RBAC, depend-
ing on the organizations needs, it is possible to consider different
resource attributes, AttrResource , and set of operations, Op. The
set of grants isGr = {allow,deny} and the valid interval of time of
an authorization is [0,∞]. Example 2.3 illustrates an authorization
in TRBAC.
Example 2.3. Consider the authorization from Example 2.2. As-
sume that the role of Cashier has two tasks: approve customer order
and review customer order statistics, denoted by t1 and t2, respec-
tively. Anne wants to allow write access to file File1 to the per-
sons responsible for t1 and allow read access to those responsible
for t2. These authorizations can be expressed using our concep-
tual structure as follows: AAna1 = ⟨Ana, role=Cashier ∧ task=t1,
name=File1, write, allow, [0,∞]⟩ and AAna2 = ⟨Ana, role= Cashier
∧ task = t2, name = File1, read, allow, [ 0,∞] ⟩, where role and
task are person attributes in AttrPerson .
An Attribute-Based Access Control Model, ABAC, was intro-
duced in [29]. ABAC considers that subjects and resources have
a set of attributes which specify their characteristics. The autho-
rizations in ABAC are defined based on these attributes and not
only on the roles and tasks that persons perform in an organization
like RBAC or TRBAC. Then the subjects and resources involve in
an authorization are defined exactly like in our definition, Defini-
tion 2.1. However, ABAC does not formalize the operations and
grants that can be supported by an authorization. The authors as-
sume that an authorization is created with the purpose of allow
access. Furthermore, an authorization in ABAC does not take into
account the user who has assigned the authorization. This is be-
cause the authors have considered a single administrator entity
who is on charge of assigning authorizations. Then in ABAC, us-
ing our conceptual structure of authorization, the set of users is a
singleton set, U = {Administrator}. The sets of person attributes
and resource attributes depend on the organization needs. For in-
stance, AttrPerson = {name,aдe} and AttrResource = {type}. The
sets of operations and grants are Op = {access} and Gr = {allow},
respectively. The interval of time during which an authorization is
valid is [0,∞]. Example 2.4 illustrates an authorization in ABAC.
Example 2.4. Let us consider a system administrator who wants
to allow access to the movie called ABC to everyone older than
16 years of age. We call this authorization Aadmin . Aadmin is ex-
pressed using our conceptual structure as: Aadmin = ⟨ Adminis-
trator, aдe ≥ 16,name = ABC , access,allow, [0,∞] ⟩, where age is
a person attribute in AttrPerson , name is a resource attribute in
AttrResource , access is an operation in Op, allow is a grant in Gr ,
and [0,∞] is the valid time period of the authorization.
A Relation-Based Access Control Model, RelBAC, was presented
in [8]. RelBAC was designed to cover the access control needs
in social networks. In RelBAC, authorizations are modeled based
on the relationships between users, e.g., friend or colleague. It is,
in RelBAC, users are classified in groups, e.g., group of friends
or colleagues, and the allow or deny authorizations are assigned
to these groups. With respect to our conceptual structure of au-
thorization, the set of person attributes in RelBAC is AttrPerson =
{relationship}, the set of resource attributes isAttrResource = {type},
the set of operations is Op = {read, taд,publish, share, comment}
and the set of grants is Gr = {allow,deny}. Example 2.5 illustrates
an authorization in RelBAC.
Example 2.5. Let us consider a user Anne who wants to allow
read access to her photos to all her friends. This authorization, can
be expressed using our conceptual structure as follows: AAna =
⟨ Ana, relationship=Ana’s friend, type = photos, read, allow, [0,∞] ⟩,
where relationship is a person attribute in AttrPerson , type is a re-
source attribute inAttrResource , read is an operation inOp, allow is
a grant inGr , and [0,∞] is the valid time period of the authorization.
A Fine-Grained Access Control Model for relational databases,
FGAC, was proposed in [22]. The authorizations in FGAC allow
specifying whether subjects can access to attributes of a table in
a relational database or not. Authorizations are assigned to sub-
jects based on their names or roles. In FGAC, using our conceptual
structure of authorization, the sets of person attributes, resource
attributes, operations and grants are AttrPerson = {name, role},
AttrResource = {Table’s attributes}, Op = {read,write,delete}
and Gr = {allow,deny}, respectively. The interval of time during
which an authorization is valid is [0,∞]. A Tuple based access con-
trol model, TBAC, was proposed in [25]. TBAC regulates the access
to tuples in relational databases. In TBAC, the access to a tuple is
granted to subjects based on their attributes, which is similar to the
person attributes AttrPerson defined in our conceptual structure
of authorization. The set of resource attributes is AttrResource =
{Table’s tuples}, the set of operations isOp = {read,write,delete},
the set of grants is Gr = {allow,deny}, and the interval of time is
[0,∞].
For the sake of simplicity, in the remaining of this paper, we omit
from the notation of an authorization, the element time.
In the next section, Section 2.3, we introduce a new type of
authorization, called mutual authorization.
2.3 Mutual Authorization –
Syntax and Semantics
Existing access control models are based on the grantsGr = {deny,
allow}. An allow authorization A uses allow and states that user (A)
authorizes subjects(A) to invoke op(A) on res(A). A deny authoriza-
tion uses deny and states that user (A) forbids subjects(A) to invoke
op(A) on res(A).
We extend Gr with a new kind of grant, which we call mutual.
Mutual grants capture the reciprocity phenomenon by means of
mutual authorizations. Here, given an authorization A, the decision
whether a person s is allowed to invoke op(A) on res(A) does not
only depend on the authorization that s has received but also on the
ones that s has assigned. Given two authorizations A and B, we use
res(A) = res(B) to indicate that the resources in both authorizations
are of the same type.
Definition 2.6 (Mutual authorization). Given an authorization
A, A is mutual if дrant(A) = mutual. A mutual authorization A
states that user (A) allows invoking op(A) on res(A) to the subjects
in subjects(A) who have issued an authorization B to user (A) to
invoke op(B) on res(B) where the following expression evaluates to
true: (res(B) = res(A))∧ (дrant(B) = allow∨дrant(B) = mutual)∧
(op(B) = op(A)).
This new authorization can be added to any model in line with
our conceptual structure. We use the RBAC model to study/show-
case how this addition can be done.
We assume that authorizations remain stable for some time.
This rules out that users relax their authorizations for a moment,
merely to spy out all others, i.e., changing a deny authorization to
a mutual one and right after accessing the resource returning to
deny. This aspect also affects existing access control model such
as the Relation-based access control model. Doing away with it is
future work.
For simplicity and to ease the presentation, in the remaining
of this paper, we will consider RBAC and a setting with positions
as the only resources type. Therefore, we restrict the elements of
an authorization, as follows: (1) The set of attribute for persons is
AttrPerson = {role,name}. Given a subject s , r (s) is the set of roles
of s . The set of subjects that receive a given authorization A is
subjects(A) = {s ∈ S | name=s ∨ (∃r : role=r ∧ r ∈ r (s))}. (2) The
resources are the positions of the users. We assume that each user
u ∈ U has one physical position, pu . (3) The set of operations is
Op = {read}. (4) The set of grants is Gr = {allow,mutual ,deny}.
2.4 Conflict Resolution
Definition 2.7 (Authorization conflict). Given a set of authoriza-
tions AC ⊆ A , a subject s ∈ S and a user u ∈ U , an authorization
conflict exists with respect to u and s if s has received more than
one authorization on the same resource with different grants as-
signed by u. An authorization conflict exists with respect to u and
s if ∃A,B ∈ AC : (user (A) = user (B) = u) ∧ (s ∈ subjects(A) ∩
subjects(B)) ∧ (res(A) = res(B)) ∧ (дrant(A) , дrant(B)).
Example 2.8. Consider a person s with roles r (s) = {r1, r2} and
the authorizations A = ⟨u, role = r1,pu , read,mutual⟩ and B =
⟨u, role = r2,pu , read,deny⟩. AuthorizationsA and B are in conflict
with respect to u and s . Namely,A assigns amutual grant to s while
B assigns a deny grant to s for reading the same resource pu .
To solve authorization conflicts, i.e., decide which authorization
prevails over the others when in conflict, several conflict resolution
strategies have been proposed [11], such as recency-overrides where
authorizations specified later take precedence over earlier ones.
We in turn resort to a deny-mutual precedence strategy, where
authorizations are assigned precedence based on their grants.
Definition 2.9 (Deny-mutual precedence strategy). A deny-mutual
precedence strategy is a prioritization of the grants in Gr which
states that a deny authorization precedes amutual one and amutual
one precedes an allow one. We write deny ≫mutual ≫ allow .
We select the precedence deny ≫ mutual ≫ allow because as-
signing a higher precedence to deny eliminates the risk of possible
leakage [11]. Next, we interpret an operation not granted explicitly
as denied. — Intuitively, the process which solves conflicts is as
follows. Given a set of authorizations B and a subject s , we take
all authorizations A ∈ B where s ∈ subjects(A) and group them by
the user who has assigned them. We call the function that does
this grouping authorization-grouping function. Each group contains
authorizations where the user who has assigned them is the same,
and there are no two or more sets containing authorizations as-
signed by the same user. Then, for each group of authorizations,
we select the authorization with the highest precedence based on
deny ≫ mutual ≫ allow . Given two authorizations A and B, we
write A ≫ B to denote that дrant(A) ≫ дrant(B). We now formal-
ize the notion of conflict resolution.
Definition 2.10 (Authorization-Grouping Function). An —autho-
rization-grouping function group : P(A) × S → P(P(A)) takes
as input a set of authorizations B ⊆ A and a subject s ∈ S and
outputs a set C of sets of authorizations such that:
(1)
⋃
D∈C D = {A ∈ B | s ∈ subjects(A)}.
(2) ∀D1,D2 ∈ C : D1 , D2 ⇒ D1 ∩D2 = ∅.
(3) ∀D ∈ C,∀A,B ∈ D : user (A) = user (B) ∧ s ∈ subjects(A) ∩
subjects(B).
(4) ∀D1,D2 ∈ C,∀A ∈ D1,∀B ∈ D2 : D1 , D2 ⇒ user(A) ,
user(B).
Example 2.11. Consider the authorizationsA, B and the subject s
from Example 2.8 and the authorizationsB = {A,B,C,D,E}, where
C= ⟨v, name=s,pv , read, allow⟩,D= ⟨ u, name=v,pu , read,mutual ⟩
and E= ⟨v, role = r1, pv , read, mutual ⟩. The output of the autho-
rization-grouping functionдroup(B, s) is the setC={{A, B}, {C,E}},
where C contains all authorizations with subject s , and each set in
C has authorizations assigned by the same user.
A user-grant tuple is a tuple ⟨tuser , tдrant ⟩ where tuser is a user
inU and tдrant is a grant inGr . Our resolve-conflicts function does
not consider the resources involved in the authorizations in conflict
because we restrict our study to a specific resource, the physical
positions of users.
Definition 2.12 (Resolve-Conflicts Function). A resolve-conflicts
function resC : P(A) × S → P(U ×Gr ) is a function that takes
as input a set of authorizations B ⊆ A and a subject s ∈ S and
outputs a set C of user-grant tuples. For each set of authorizations
B1 ⊆ B with respect to subject s that are in conflict, C contains a
user-grant tuple ⟨tuser , tдrant ⟩, where tuser is the user who has
assigned the authorizations in B1, and tдrant is the grant with the
highest precedence in B1 that tuser has given to s . Given a tuple
t ∈ resC(B, s), we use tuser and tдrant to refer to the first and




C ∈ B,∀A ∈ B : C ≫ A}
if ∀A,B ∈ B : user(A)
= user(B) ∧ s ∈ sub-
jects(A) ∩ subjects(B)⋃
B1∈group(B,s) resC(B1, s) otherwise
Example 2.13. Consider the authorizationsA, B from Example 2.8.
To resolve conflicts, we invoke the function resC({A,B}, s). Since
user (A) = user (B) ∧ s ∈ subjects(A) ∩ subjects(B) and deny ≫
mutual, the resolve-conflicts function outputs the set resC({A,B}, s)
= {⟨u,deny⟩}.
2.5 Authorized Access Request
The semantics of all authorization can be reduced to questions of
the form: “Can s read the position of u?”. We call this an access
request. To answer it in the context of mutual authorizations, one
must consider the authorizations that u has assigned to s and the
ones that u has received from s .
Definition 2.14 (Access request). An access request Req = ⟨s,
read,pu ⟩ is a tuple consisting of a person s , the operation read
and a position of a person u, pu . An access request indicates that s
requests to read the physical position of u.
An access request ⟨s, read,pu ⟩ is authorized if, after resolving
conflicts with respect to s , there exists (1) a tuple with the grant
allow or (2) a tuple with the grant mutual, and after resolving
conflicts with respect to u there is a tuple either with the grant
allow or mutual. The following definition formalizes this notion.
Definition 2.15 (Authorized access request). Given the set of au-
thorizations A , an access request ⟨s,read,pu ⟩ is authorized if one
of the following conditions is met:
(1) ∃t ∈ resC(A, s) : tuser = u ∧ tgrant = allow
(2) ∃t ∈ resC(A, s),∃e ∈ resC(A,u) : tuser = u ∧ tgrant =
mutual ∧ euser = s ∧ (egrant = allow ∨ egrant = mutual).
So far we have introduced our conceptual structure of authoriza-
tions and we have described existing access control models using
this structure. We have also discussed how authorization conflicts
are solved and the syntax and semantics of mutual authorizations.
In addition, it is important to define the soundness principle that an
algorithm in the context of LBSs and mutual authorizations should
fulfill. In the next section, Section 2.6, we define this principle.
2.6 Soundness Criteria
An algorithm is sound if it is both correct and complete [23]. We now
introduce two constraints, location and authorization constraints,
which will be used to define the soundness and completeness of an
algorithm in the context of LBSs and mutual authorizations.
Definition 2.16 (Location constraint). A location constraint,
LCons, is a predicate on physical positions.
Let dist(px ,ps ) denote the distance between the physical posi-
tions of users x and s .
Example 2.17. Consider a distance d and the physical positions
of two persons u and s , pu and ps , respectively, dist(pu ,ps ) ≤ d is
a location constraint.
Definition 2.18 (Authorization constraint). Given two persons, u
and s , an authorization constraint ACons is a predicate on a set
of authorizationsM that involve persons u and s .
Example 2.19. Let a set of authorizationsM and two persons u
and s be given. The access request ⟨s, read,pu ⟩ is an authorization
constraint. If ⟨s, read,pu ⟩ is authorized, the predicate evaluates to
true; otherwise it evaluates to false.
Definition 2.20 (Query). Given a set of persons P , a query Q(C )
is a set of location and authorization constraints C . Its output is the
elements of P that fulfill C . AnsP (Q(C )) is the output of Q(C ).
A user algorithm is an algorithm which outputs a set of users
who fulfill a set of constraints given as algorithm input.
Definition 2.21 (User algorithm). A user algorithm Π : P(U ) ×
P(Cons) → P(U ) is an algorithm that has as input a set of users
U1 ∈ P(U ) and a set of constraints C and outputs a set of usersU2.
In the context of LBSs and mutual authorizations, a user algo-
rithm Π computes a location and an authorization constraint on
the physical positions of a given set of persons P . Based on these
two constraints, we define the correctness and completeness of Π.
Definition 2.22 (Correctness in the context of LBSs and mutual
authorizations). Let a user algorithm Π, a set U1 ∈ P(U ) and
a set of constraints C = {LCons,ACons} be given. Π is correct
with respect to U1 and C if for all u ∈ Π(U1, {LCons,ACons}),
u ∈ AnsU1 (Q(LCons)) ∧ u ∈ AnsAnsU
1
(Q (LCons))(Q(ACons)).
In other words, correctness is given if for all usersu in the output
of Π, (1) u is a person in U 1 that fulfills LCons and (2) u is a person
in AnsU1 (Q(LCons)) that fulfills ACons .
Definition 2.23 (Completeness in the context of LBSs and mutual
authorizations). Let a user algorithm Π, a setU1 ∈ P(U ) and con-
straints C = {LCons,ACons} be given. Π is complete with respect
to U1 and C if for all persons u with u ∈ AnsU1 (Q(LCons)) ∧ u ∈
AnsAnsU
1
(Q(LCons))(Q(ACons)), u ∈ Π(U1, {LCons,ACons}).
To illustrate completeness, think of a user algorithm Π that al-
ways outputs an empty set. Then Π fulfills the correctness principle.
However, Π is not useful.
Definition 2.24 (Soundness in the context of LBSs and mutual autho-
rizations). Let a user algorithm Π, a set U1 ∈ P(U ) and constraints
C = {LCons,ACons} be given. Π is sound with respect to U1 and
C if (1) Π is correct with respect toU1 and C and (2) Π is complete
with respect toU1 and C .
3 INTEGRATING LBS
WITH MUTUAL AUTHORIZATIONS
Before proceeding to describe our set of primitives and algorithms
for integration LBSs with mutual authorizations, we present our
algorithm for resolving conflicts.
3.1 Resolve Conflicts Algorithm
Authorization conflicts can be solved at design time, i.e., during the
insertion of authorizations in a system, or at query time, i.e., when
an access to a resource is required. Solving authorization conflicts
at design time could require to modify the structure of an organiza-
tion, see Example 3.1. For this reason, we consider authorization
conflicts have to be solved at query time. In the next, we present
our algorithm to solve authorization conflicts, see Algorithm 1. We
use the left arrow “←" to indicate that the value on the right hand
side is assigned to the term on the left hand side.
Example 3.1. Let us consider Example 2.8. Assume now that
the authorization A has been inserted first in the system and now
user u wants to insert authorization B. Based on the deny-mutual
precedence strategy, authorization B has precedence over A. Then,
during the insertion process, with respect to subject s , authorization
B should be inserted andA should be deleted. However, this change
will affect all users who have either role1 or role2. In this case it
may be necessary to modify the organizational structure of the
business in such a way that this authorization update will not affect
to other users.
Given a set of authorizations B ⊆ A a set of usersU and a set of
subjects S, the resolveConflicts algorithm, Algorithm 1, resolves the
existing authorization conflicts in the set of authorizations B with
respect to each subject s ∈ S and the users in the setU. Algorithm 1
starts by initializing an empty map autMap which will store pairs of
keys and values. The key of the map is a pair consisting of a user and
a subject, and the value of the map corresponds to the grant of an
authorization. For each authorization A in B, the algorithm verifies
if (1) user (A) is inside the set of users U and (2) the intersection
between subjects(A) and S is not an empty set. If the previous is
true, for each s ∈ subjects(A) ∩ S, the algorithm checks if there is
an entry in the map autMap with key (user (A), s). If there is such
an entry and the grant stored in this entry has lower precedence
than the grant of the authorization A, the algorithm updates the
value of the entry to дrant(A). Otherwise, the algorithm adds the
entry with key (user (A), s) and value дrant(A) to the map autMap.
Algorithm 1: resolveConflicts
Input :Authorization Set B, user Set U, subject Set S
Output :Map autMap
1 Initialize: autMap⟨(user , subject),дrant⟩ ← empty map;
2 foreach authorization A in B do
3 if user (A) ∈ U ∧ subjects(A) ∩ S , ∅ then
4 foreach s ∈ subjects(A) ∩ S do
5 if autMap.containsKey((user (A), s)) then
6 if autMap.дet((user (A), s)) ≪ дrant(A) then
7 autMap.put((user (A), s),дrant(A));
8 else
9 autMap.put((user (A), s),дrant(A));
10 return autMap;
In the next, given as input to Algorithm 1 the sets B, U, S, we
prove that Algorithm 1 solve all authorization conflicts in the set B
with respect to each subject s ∈ S and the set of users U.
Lemma 3.2. Given an authorization set B ⊆ A , a set of users U,
a set of subjects S and the subset of authorizations N = {A ∈ B |
user (A) ∈ U, subjects(A)∩S , ∅}, for each s ∈ S and for each tuple〈
tuser , tдrant
〉
∈ resC(N , s) exists an entry e = ((tuser , s), tдrant )
in resolveConflicts(B,U,S).
Proof. First, we will show that each entry in the map autMap,
output by Algorithm 1, corresponds to one authorization in the
set N = {A ∈ B | user (A) ∈ U, subjects(A) ∩ S , ∅}. In Line
2, Algorithm 1 considers all authorizations A ∈ B, and in Line 3
the if condition evaluates if A satisfies the constraint user (A) ∈
U, subjects(A) ⊆ S. Entries are added in the map, Lines 7 and
9, using only authorizations that fulfill the if condition. Second,
we will show that for each entry e = ((u, s),дrant) in autMap,
where u ∈ U and s ∈ S, the grant authMap.дet(u, s) is the one
with the highest precedence with respect to u and s in the set B.
For each pair of elements (u, s), Algorithm 1 verifies if there is an
entry with key (u, s) in autMap, Line 5. If such an entry exists,
the grant of the entry is updated only if the grant of the entry
has lower precedence than the grant of the authorization that is
being evaluated, дrant(A), Lines 6-7. If there is not such an entry,
Algorithm 1 creates a new entry in the mapwith key (u, s) and value
дrant(A), Line 9. Once Algorithm 1 has evaluated all authorizations
in B, autMap will contain, for each pair of elements u, s , the grant
with the highest precedence in the set B with respect to u and
s . Then each entry e = ((u, s),дrant) corresponds to a tuple in〈
tuser = u, tдrant = дrant
〉
in resC(N , s). □
3.2 Primitives and Algorithms
for Mutual Authorizations
Depending on the services offered by a system, one may need dif-
ferent primitives. A primitive is a basic unit that performs a specific
functionality, and that can be combined with other primitives. In
the case of LBSs, to answer queries, we need to knowwhich persons
a given person has allowed reading his physical position. The two
primitives Primitive-Request and Primitive-View are sufficient to
this end, as we will show in Section 3.4.
• Primitive-Request: Given two persons u and s , may s read the
physical position of u?
• Primitive-View: Given a person s , whose physical positions
is s allowed to read? We call this set Views , the view of s .
In the following, we present our algorithms, Pr-Request algo-
rithm and Pr-View algorithm to implement the primitives Primitive-
Request and Primitive-View, respectively. Since authorization con-
flicts can exist, both algorithms make use of the resolveConflicts
algorithm, Algorithm 1.
Given two personsu and s , the Pr-Request algorithm, Algorithm 2,
determines if person s can can read the physical position of personu.
The Pr-Request algorithm, Algorithm 2, starts by initializing, among
others, the set Setr eq which contains the person who request the
access and the set Setpp which contains the person whose physical
position is requested, Line 1. Next, the algorithm invokes the re-
solveConflicts algorithm on the sets A , Setpp and Setr eq . The output
of the resolveConflicts algorithm is stored in the map ReceiveAuts .
Since Setpp and Setr eq have one element each, ReceiveAuts con-
tains only one entry e with key (u, s) and the value corresponds to
the grant of the authorization with the highest precedence that u
has assigned to s . If e.getValue() = allow , the algorithm returns true .
If e.getValue() =mutual , the algorithm invokes the resolveConflicts
algorithm on the sets A , Setr eq and Setpp . The output of the re-
solveConflicts algorithm is stored in the map ReceiveAutu , Line
7. ReceiveAutu contains only one entry t with key (s,u) and the
value corresponds to the grant of the authorization with the high-
est precedence that s has assigned to u. If t.getValue() = allow or
t.getValue() =mutual , the algorithm returns true , which indicates
that s is allowed to read the physical position of u, pu . Otherwise s
is not allowed.
Given a person s , the Pr-View algorithm, Algorithm 3, outputs the
view of s . Algorithm 3 starts by initializing, among others, the setsU
and S. The algorithm assigns the set of all usersU to the setU and
the person s , given as input, to the set S. During the initialization,
the algorithm also invokes the resolveConflicts algorithm on the
sets A , U and S, and stores the output in the map ReceiveAuts .
For each entry e in ReceiveAuts , if e.getValue() = allow , the user
that is part of the key of the entry e is stored in the set Views ,
Lines 3-4. Given an entry e ∈ ReceiveAuts , we use the notation
e .дetKey.User () to refer to the user that is part of the key of entry
e . If e.getValue() = mutual , e .дetKey.User () is added to the set
MutualRA, Lines 5-6. If the set MutualRA is not an empty set, then
the algorithm invokes the resolveConflicts algorithm on the sets A ,
S and MutualRA, and stores the output in the map AuthMaps . For
each useru ∈ MutualRA, the algorithm verifies ifAuthMaps has an
entry with key (s,u) with value equal to allow or mutual. If there
is such an entry, the algorithm adds u to the set Views .
Algorithm 2: Pr-Request
Input :Authorization Set A , Access request ⟨s, read,pu ⟩
Output :Boolean resp
1 Initialize: Setpp ← {u}, Setr eq ← {s},
ReceiveAuts ⟨(user , subject),дrant⟩ ← empty map,
ReceiveAutu ⟨(user , subject),дrant⟩ ← empty map;
2 ReceiveAuts ← resolveConflicts(A, Setpp , Setr eq );
3 foreach entry e in ReceiveAuts do
4 if e.getValue() = allow then
5 return true;
6 if e.getValue() =mutual then
7 ReceiveAutu ← resolveConflicts(A, Setr eq , Setpp );
8 foreach entry t in ReceiveAutu do
9 if t.getValue() = allow ∨ t.getValue() =mutual
then
10 return true;
11 return false ;
In the next, we prove that given the authorization set A and a
person s , the output of the Pr-View algorithm, Algorithm 3, contains
all persons that s is allowed to read their physical positions and
not more. We only present the proof of Algorithm 3. The proof of
Algorithm 2 can be done in similar way as the proof as the proof of
Algorithm 3.
Lemma 3.3. Given an authorization set A and a person s ,
(1) For all persons u ∈ Pr-View(A, s), Algorithm 3, s is authorized
to read the physical position ofu with respect to Definition 2.15.
(2) If u < Pr-View(A, s), then s is not authorized to read the phys-
ical position of u with respect to Definition 2.15.
Proof. We will prove that for each user u ∈ Pr-View(A, s),
⟨s, read,pu ⟩ is authorized, Definition 2.15, if either condition (1) or
(2) is met:
(1) ∃t ∈ resC(A, s) : tuser = u ∧ tдrant = allow .
(2) ∃t ∈ resC(A, s),∃l ∈ resC(A,u) : tuser = u ∧ tдrant =
mutual ∧ luser = s ∧ (lдrant = allow ∨ lдrant =mutual)
Wehave proven in Lemma 3.2 that for each tuple ⟨ tuser, tgrant ⟩ ∈
resC(A, s) exists an entry e = ((tuser , s), tдrant ) in the output
resolveConflicts(A, {U }, {s}). Then in conditions (1) and (2), it is
Algorithm 3: Pr-View
Input :Authorization Set A , person s
Output :Set Views
1 Initialize: U← U , S ← {s} , Views ← ∅,
ReceiveAuts ⟨(user , subject),дrant⟩ ←
resolveConflicts(A,U,S),
AAs ⟨(user , subject),дrant⟩ ← empty map, MutualRA← ∅;
2 foreach entry e in ReceiveAuts do
3 if e .дetValue() = allow then
4 add e.getKey.User() to Views ;
5 if e .дetValue() =mutual then
6 add e.getKey.User() to MutualRA;
7 if MutualRA.size() , 0 then
8 AuthMaps ← resolveConflicts(A,S,MutualRA);
9 foreach u in MutualRA do
10 if AuthMaps .дet((s,u)) =
mutual ∨AuthMaps .дet((s,u)) = allow then
11 add u to Views ;
12 return Views ;




∈ resC(A, s) with an
entry e = ((tuser , s), tдrant ) ∈ resolveConflicts(A, {U }, {s}). First,
a person u is added to Pr-View(A, s), if tuser = u ∧ tдrant = allow ,
Lines 4-5. It is condition (1) was evaluated. Second, if tдrant =
mutual , then u is added to the set MutualRA, Lines 6-7. Then for
each u ∈ MutualRA, u is added to Pr-View(A, s) if exists an entry f
in resolveConflicts(A, {s},MutualRA) such that f = ((s,u),allow)
or f = ((s,u),mutual), Lines 12-13. It is condition (2) was evalu-
ated. □
3.3 System Architecture
We consider a system architecture which contains a location-based
service provider LBSP. The LBSP has : (1) a user database DBU ,
which stores the position of each user u, pu , and (2) an authoriza-
tion database DBA, which stores the authorizations A . See Figure 1.
We assume a database management system featuring R-tree index-
ing for spatial query processing on DBU and B-tree indexing for
authorizations queries on DBA. In our prototype, we have imple-
mented the LBS ourselves in Java, as well as access control, in the
form of the primitives described in Section 3.2. Note that our focus
is on the conceptual level; studying design alternatives regarding
the architecture is future work.
Fig. 1: System Architecture
The LBSP supports location-dependent queries. There are differ-
ent types of such queries [12], and we focus on two of them here:
k-nearest neighbor queries and range queries.
Definition 3.4 (Location-dependent query). Given a set of per-
sons P , a location-dependent query Q(LCons) is one that takes
a location constraint LCons and outputs the persons that fulfill it.
Definition 3.5 (k-Nearest Neighbor query). Given an integer k
and a person s , a k-nearest neighbor (kNN) query knn(k, s) is a
location-dependent query where the location constraint knnk,s (pu )
is: ∀M ⊆ U , (∀x ∈ M,dis(px ,ps ) < dis(pu ,ps )) ⇒ |M | ≤ k , where
U is the set of all users. In words, if the previous predicate evaluates
to true for a physical position pu , then the corresponding person u
is in the result of the knn(k, s) query; otherwise not.
Definition 3.6 (Range query). Given a distance d and a person s ,
a range query ranдe(d, s) is a location-dependent query with the
constraint ranдed,ps (px ): dist(px ,ps ) ≤ d .
Definition 3.5 is a higher order logic. However, to facilitate proofs
that our proposed approaches are sound, Section 3.4.3, we will use
a recursive definition, Definition 3.7.
Definition 3.7 (k-Nearest Neighbor query recursive definition). A
k-nearest neighbor query knn is a location- dependent query,
where the location constraint consists of two elements (k, s), where
k is an integer number and s is the persons who issues the query.
The result Ans(knn) of such a query is the set of users u ∈ U
such that |Ans(knn)| = k ∧ ∀u ∈ Ans(knn),∀v ∈ U \ Ans(knn) :
dist(ps ,pu ) ≤ dist(ps ,pv ).
Definition 3.8 (Bounded result-size query). Given a location-de-
pendent query Q(LCons), Q is a bounded result-size query if
the location constraint (LCons) contains an explicit restriction on
the number of elements of Ans(Q). Otherwise, Q is a unbounded
result-size query.
kNN and range queries are examples of bounded result-size and
unbounded result-size queries, respectively. IfQ is a bounded result-
size query, after executing Q and filtering Ans(Q) for users whose
position s is authorized to see, the filtered query result may not
fulfill the original constraint LCons any more.
Definition 3.9 (Authorizations received). Given the set of autho-
rizations A , the authorizations that s has received are all autho-
rizations A ∈ A such that s ∈ subjects(A).
Example 3.10. Consider a kNN query with constraint knn =
(2, s). Suppose that (1) the neighbors of s are u,v andw , and their
distances to s are 1, 2 and 3 km, respectively, and (2) s has received
two authorizations A,B where user (A) = v , дrant(A) = allow ,
user (B) = w and дrant(B) = allow . The LBSP evaluates the kNN
query and outputs Ans(kNN) = {u,v}. After filtering Ans(kNN )
based on the authorizations s has received, the result contains only
{v}. This does not meet the constraint knn = (2, s). The parameter
should have been set to k = 3, to obtain {u,w} after the filtering.
Example 3.11. Continuing with Example 3.10, suppose that s
wants to find all persons within 2 km, i.e., ranдe(2km, s). The LBSP
outputs Ans(ranдe) = {u,v}. After filtering Ans(ranдe) with re-
spect to the authorizations that s has received, the filtered result




To integrate mutual authorizations in the system architecture, we
see two design alternatives, called Querying-Filtering (QF) and
Filtering-Querying (FQ). QF has the advantage that it can leverage
existing LBS implementations. However, it has some limitations
that could affect the performance, like the need to restart querying,
as we will discuss. FQ does not have this need to restart.
3.4.1 Querying-Filtering Approach (QF). Given a location-depen-
dent query Q(LCons), the QF approach works as follows: (1) The
LBSP executes the location-dependent queryQ on the user database
DBU and returnsAns(Q). (2) It filtersAns(Q) for the persons whose
position s may read. For the filtering, there are two options:
(a) Verify for each person u ∈ Ans(Q) if ⟨s, read,pu ⟩ is autho-
rized, i.e., execute Primitive-Request. If so, then u is added to
the final answer.
(b) Compute Primitive-View, Views , Algorithm 3. The final an-
swer is the intersection of Views and Ans(Q).
With Option (a), for each person in Ans(Q), it is necessary to
read all authorizations in A to solve authorization conflicts. With
(b), although it is still needed to solve authorization conflicts, the
elements of A will be read at most two times. The first time, the
algorithm obtains the authorizations assigned to the querying per-
son. At the second time, it verifies for the mutual authorizations
whether the access request is authorized. In the following, we will
focus on QF only in combination with (b).
Algorithms 4 and 5 show the details for implementing QF for
kNN and range queries, resp. Our algorithms assume that the LBSP
uses index structures to answer location-dependent queries, like
B-tree or R-tree. We call the services used by LBSP to compute kNN
and range queries, computeKNN(knn) and computeRange( ranдe),
respectively, where knn and ranдe are the location constraints of
the queries. In what follows, we describe both algorithms. Algo-
rithm 4 receives as input the set of authorizations A , the parameters
of the kNN query k and a person s . The variables Views , tempall
and tempvisible store the view of person s , the set of all persons
that satisfy the kNN query, and the intersection of the sets tempall
and Views , respectively. Since kNN queries are bounded result-size
queries, we need to evaluate if the final result satisfies the parame-
ter k of the query. To do so, Algorithm 4 uses a while loop which
encapsulates the entire process of querying and filtering. In Line
4, the algorithm invokes a function estimateK(k,kold, s) which es-
timates an integer value, kall ≥ k such that after computing the
kall-nearest neighbors of s and filtering the result based on Views ,
the filtered result fulfills the constraint (k, s). Next, using the func-
tion computeKNN(kall , s), the algorithm computes the kall -nearest
neighbors of s ordered by distance in ascending order and stores the
result in tempall. Then, for all u ∈ tempall, if u ∈ Views , u is added
to tempvisible, while keeping the order by distance. If tempvisible
contains at least k elements, the algorithm outputs the first k . Oth-
erwise, it assigns the current value of kall to the parameter kold, and
the process of querying and filtering starts again. In each iteration,
the function estimateK computes a new integer value kall > kold.
Algorithm 5 receives as input the set of authorizations A , a
distance parameter dist and a person s . Similar to Algorithm 4,
the algorithm starts by invoking Algorithm 3 to compute the view
of s with respect to the set of authorizations A . The output of
Algorithm 3 is stored in the setViews . Then the algorithm computes
the function computeRange with the distance dist and the person
s . The result of this functions is stored in the set tempall . Finally,
Algorithm 5 filters the result by intersecting tempall and Views ,
and outputs the final result set Ans .
Algorithm 4: Querying-Filtering kNN
Input :Authorization Set A , int k , person s
Output :Set Ans
1 Initialize: Views ← ∅, Ans ← ∅, tempall ← [ ],
tempvisible ← [ ], notEnouдh ← true , kall ← 0, kold ← 0;
2 Views ← Pr-View(A, s);
3 while notEnouдh do
4 kall ← estimateK(k,kold , s);
5 tempall ← computeKNN(kall , s);
6 tempvisible ← f ilter (tempall ,Views );
7 if tempvisible .size() ≥ k then
8 Ans ← select topK(k, tempvisible );
9 notEnouдh ← f alse;
10 else
11 kold ← kall ;
12 return Ans;
Algorithm 5: Querying-Filtering Range
Input :Authorization Set A , double dist , person s
Output :Set Ans
1 Initialize: Views ← ∅, Ans ← ∅, tempall ← ∅;
2 Views ← Pr-View(A, s);
3 tempall ← computeRange(dist , s);
4 Ans ← tempall ∩Views ;
5 return Ans;
3.4.2 Filtering-Querying Approach (FQ). Given a location-depen-
dent query Q(LCons), the FQ approach works as follows: (1) The
LBSP invokes the Pr-View algorithm to determine the personswhose
positions s is allowed to see, i.e., Primitive-View. (2) The LBSP exe-
cutesQ over these persons and outputs a final result. Contrary to QF,
since the evaluation of the location-dependent queries must take
place on the filtered result, the LBSP cannot use the pre-computed
materializations, i.e., computeKNN(knn) and computeRanдe(ranдe).
Then the LBSP needs new primitives to execute the supported
queries. We have identified two primitives: (1) computeD(ps ,pu ),
which compute the distance between the physical positions of two
given persons s and u, and (2) sort by distance sortByD(M), where
M is a list of tuples each of which consists of a person u and a
distance d . To implement the first primitive, we use the well-known
Haversine distance [19], and for the second one, we use the merge
sort algorithm. See Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7 for kNN and range
queries, respectively.
Algorithm 6 receives as input the authorization set A , the pa-
rameter of the kNN query k and a person s . To compute the view of
s , the algorithm invokes Algorithm 3 on the set of authorizations
A and the person s . The output of Algorithm 3 is stored in the set
Views . For each person u ∈ Views , the algorithm computes the
distance between u and s and adds the tuple ⟨u,d⟩ to the set Dist ,
Lines 4-5. Next, Algorithm 6 sorts by distance the set Dist and for
each tuple ⟨u,d⟩ it stores u in the listVieworder .Vieworder stores
all users u ∈ Views ordered by distance in ascending order. Finally,
the algorithm selects the first k elements of the listVieworder , Line
8.
Algorithm 7 receives as input the set of authorizations A , a
distance parameter dist and a person s . The steps 2-6 are the same
as the ones of Algorithm 6. Then Algorithm 7 analyzes each tuple
t ∈ Dist and verifies if the distance stored in t , tdistance , is smaller
or equal than the distance dist . If the previous is true, the person
stored in tuple t , tpers , is added to the final answer, Lines 7-10.
Algorithm 6: Filtering-Querying kNN
Input :Authorization Set A , int k , person s
Output :Set Ans
1 Initialize: Views ← ∅, Dist ← ∅, Vieworder ← [ ], Ans ← ∅;
2 Views ← Pr-View(A, s);
3 foreach person u in Views do
4 double d ← computeD(ps ,pu );
5 add tuple ⟨u,d⟩ to Dist
6 Vieworder ← sortByD(Dist);
7 Ans ← select topK(k,Vieworder );
8 return Ans
Algorithm 7: Filtering-Querying Range
Input :Authorization Set A , double dist , person s
Output :Set Ans
1 Initialize: Views ← ∅, Dist ← ∅, neiдhbors , Ans ← ∅;
2 Views ← Pr-View(A, s);
3 foreach person u in Views do
4 double d ← computeD(ps ,pu );
5 add tuple ⟨u,d⟩ to Dist
6 foreach tuple t in Dis do
7 if tdistance ≤ dist then
8 Ans ← tpers ;
9 return Ans
Advantages and Disadvantages of QF and FQ: With QF, the LBSP
can make use of the available index structures in the user database.
However, in the case of bounded result-size queries, the LBSP may
need to restart the query if the filtered result does not satisfy the
initial constraints, cf. Example 3.10. With FQ, bounded result-size
queries do not require restarts, Example 3.11. However, the evalua-
tion of location-dependent queries must take place on the filtered
result. The LBSP cannot use the indexes structures of the user data-
base to execute queries efficiently. Finally, with both approaches,
the costs of updates, i.e., positions of persons and authorizations
updates, only depend on the scalability and costs of updating the in-
dex structures used. The analysis of the impact of updates is beyond
the scope of this paper. It also can be found elsewhere [15].
3.4.3 QF and FQ Are Sound. In this paper, we assume that the
algorithms used to evaluate a given location-dependent query are
correct and complete with respect to the location constraint LCons .
This means that the integration of these algorithms into the context
of mutual authorizations is correct and complete. The proofs that
our integration of the algorithms to answer range queries into the
context ofmutual authorizations, Algorithms 5 and 7, are sound can
be done in the same manner following the proofs of Lemmas 3.12
and 3.13. Therefore, we only present the proofs for the algorithms
that support kNN queries.
Lemma 3.12. Let a set of authorizations A and a location constraint
(k, s) of a kNN query be given, where k is an integer, and s is the query
issuer. Algorithm 4, QF for kNN queries, is sound.
Proof. An algorithm is sound Definition 2.24, if it is correct and
complete. Let Ans be the result output by Algorithm 4. We first
prove that Algorithm 4 is correct with respect to Definition 2.22.
We assume that the service used by Algorithm 4 to compute a given
kNN query, computeKNN(kall, s), where kall ≥ k , Line 5, is correct
with respect to the location constraint (kall , s). If a person u is in
Ans , u is in tempvisible, Line 8. If u is in tempvisible, then u is tempall
and u is in Views , Line 6. Views is the output of Pr-View( A, s),
so s is authorized to read the physical position of u, Lemma 3.3.
Then, u ∈ rst(AConsA,s ,U ), where AConsA,s is an authorization
constraint. Since u is in tempall , u is in computeKNN (kall , s). Since
computeKNN(kall , s) is correct, then u satisfies the location con-
straint (kall , s)with respect toU . Furthermore, the size of tempvisible
is greater or equal than k , and topK selects the k first elements from
tempvisible. Then u ∈ rst((k, s), rst(AConsA,s ,U )). Consequently,
Algorithm 4 is correct. Now we prove that Algorithm 4 is com-
plete with respect to Definition 2.23. Consider a person u with
u ∈ rst(AConsA,s ,U ) ∧ u ∈ rst((k, s), rst( AConsA,s ,U )). Be-
cause u satisfies the authorization constraint with respect to U ,
u is in Views . Since Views = rst(AConsA,s , U ), Definition 2.18, u
is in rest((k, s),Views ) and rest((k, s),Views ) ⊆ rest(( kall , s ),U ),
then u is in rest((kall, s),U ). We know that computeKNN(kall , s) is
complete. Then u is in tempall and u is in tempvisible . Because
u ∈ rst ((k, s),Views ), then u is in topK and u is Ans . Hence, Algo-
rithm 4 is complete; consequently, it is sound.
□
Lemma 3.13. Let a set of authorizations A and a location constraint
(k, s) of a kNN query be given, where k is an integer, and s is the query
issuer. Algorithm 6, FQ for kNN queries, is sound.
Proof. An algorithm is sound, Definition 2.24, if it is correct
and complete. Let Ans be the result output by Algorithm 6. We first
prove that Algorithm 6 is correct with respect to Definition 2.22. If
a person u is inAns , u is in the listVieworder , Line 8. Then there is
a 2-element tuple ⟨u,d⟩ in Dist , which means u is in Views . Views
is the output of Pr-View(A, s). So s is authorized to read the posi-
tion of u, Lemma 3.3. Then u ∈ rst(AConsA,s ,U ), where AConsA,s
is an authorization constraint. Algorithm 6 uses the primitives
computeD, sortByD and topK to compute the k-nearest neighbors
of a given person s . We assume that the combination of these prim-
itives to compute a given kNN query is correct with respect to
the location constraint (k, s). Since these primitives compute the
result using as input the set Views , Line 3, u ∈ rst((k, s),Views ),
and Views = rst(AConsA,s ,U ). Then Algorithm 6 is correct. We
now prove that Algorithm 6 is complete with respect to Defini-
tion 2.23. Consider a person u with u ∈ rst(AConsA,s ,U ) ∧ u ∈
rst((k, s), rst(AConsA,s ,U )). Because u satisfies the authorization
constraint with respect to U , u ∈ Views . Since u ∈ Views , there
is a 2-element tuple ⟨u,d⟩ in Dist . Then u is in Vieworder , Line
7. Because u satisfies the location constraint (k, s) with respect to
the set Views , u is in topK(k,Vieworder ). Then u is in Ans . Hence,
Algorithm 6 is complete. Therefore, Algorithm 4 is sound. □
4 TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
A complexity analysis is helpful (1) to predict the behavior of FQ
and QF, and (2) to facilitate meaningful comparisons. An average
complexity analysis depends on the internal behavior of the data-
base, which is (1) specific to the product, and (2) is not openly
available. Furthermore, if there are changes in the system settings,
the average analysis is void. So our complexity analysis targets at
the worst case, which offers stronger guarantees.
4.1 Time Complexity Analysis of QF and FQ
To fulfill a given location constraint (k, s) of a kNN query, Algo-
rithm 4 uses an estimation function estimateK, which estimates a
value kall ≥ k for a given k , such that after computing the kall -
nearest neighbors of s and filtering the result based on Views , the
filtered result satisfies the original constraint (k, s). Let kr eal be
the value of kall Algorithm 4 uses to compute the final output, i.e.,
kr eal is equal to the value kall of the last run of Algorithm 4. Let
further be δ = kr eal − k .
For the analysis of Algorithm 4, we assume that estimateK com-
putes the value kr eal in the first run, i.e., no restarts are needed.
We discuss this assumption later in Section 4.2.
Lemma 4.1. Let the number of persons n, a kNN query knn=(k,s),
the view size of the query issuer, s , |Views |, and a set of authorizations
A , be given. The time complexity of QF with no restarts is
TC = O(n + (k + δ ) · |Views |) +O(A) (1)
Proof. The following steps are required to compute a given
kNN query with the querying-filtering approach, with no restarts:
Step1 computes the viewViews of the query issuer s . We useO(A)
to denote the complexity of this step.
Step2 searches the (k + δ )-nearest neighbors in the user databa-
se. The complexity of a kNN query using R-tree indexes is
O(n) [14]. We validated through initial experiments that this
complexity applies to the praxis.
Step3 filters the result by checking for each person returned in
Step
2
if the person is in the view Views . The complexity of
this step is O((k + δ ) · |Views |).
Consequently, the time complexity of executing a kNN query
with the querying-filtering approach isTC = O(n+(k+δ )· |Views |)+
O(A). □
Lemma 4.2. Let the number of personsn, a kNN query knn = (k, s),
the size of the view of the query issuer s , |Views |, and the set of
authorizations A be given. The time complexity of FQ is
TC = O
(




Proof. The following steps are required to compute a given
kNN query with the filtering-querying approach:
Step1 computes the view,Views of the query issuer s . We useO(A)
to denote the complexity of this step.
Step2 looks up in the user database to obtain the physical position
of each person in the view Views . This has a complexity of
O(|Views | · log(n)).
Step3 computes the distance between the querying user and each
of the persons in the view Views . The complexity of this
step is O(|Views |).
Step4 orders the persons in the view Views by distance to the
querying user s in ascending order. The order is done using
the merge sort algorithm. The complexity of this step is
O(|Views | · log(|Views |)).
Step5 selects the k first persons. This has a complexity of O(k).
Consequently, the time complexity of executing a kNN query with
the filtering-querying approach isTC=O(|Views | ·log(n)+ |Views |+
|Views | · log(|Views |) + k) +O(A). □
We note that, since ∀x > 0,n > 0 : x > x · loд(n), Equation (2)





to allow a more accurate comparison of both approaches in the
next section, Section 4.2, we do not simplify it.
4.2 Comparison of the QF and FQ Approaches
To decide which approach is better to answer a given query, one
needs to compare the complexity of both approaches, QF and FQ,
and find their intersection points:
O(n + (k + δ ) · |Views |) +O(A) = O
(
|Views | · log(n)
+ |Views | + |Views | · log(|Views |) + k) +O(A
)
(3)
Solving (3) for |Views | yields (4). For given values of n, k and δ ,
(4) is the size of the view so that the time complexity in the worst
case is equal. We refer to this size of the view as Viewequal .W in
(4) is the Lambert-W function [4].
Viewequal (n,k,δ ) =
n · ln(2) − k · ln(2)
W(21−k−δ · n · (n − k) · ln(2))
(4)
We now analyze Eq. (4) with the best case scenario for QF, which
is the one where the nearest neighbors of s are the persons whose
positions s is allowed to read, i.e., δ=0. Equation (4) depends on
the parameters: n,k and δ . To further simplify it, similarly to other
approaches [10, 28], we set the parameters k of the kNN query to 20,
and δ=0. Then Viewequal only depends on the number of persons n.
Viewequal (n, 20, 0) =
n · ln(2) − k · ln(2)
W(2−19 · n · (n − 20) · ln(2))
(5)
Figure 2 plots the QF and FQ approaches, for k = 20 and δ = 0.
The x-axis is the number of persons n, the y-axis the size of the view
|Views | of the query issuer s and the z-axis the time complexityTC .
Figure 2 shows the intersection points of both approaches. Given
an intersection point and its corresponding number of persons
n, Equation (5) yields the size of its view. We conclude that, for
a given n, if |Views | < Viewequal , the time complexity of FQ is
smaller than that of QF, and vice versa. In Table 1, using Equation (5),
we list the intersection points of QF and FQ, for different numbers
of persons n. For instance, if n = 2000, Viewequal ≈ 1014.31. Then,
for n = 2000, if the size of the view of the query issuer is smaller
than approximately 1014.31, FQ performs better than QF.
Fig. 2: Complexity of the QF and FQ Approaches
– knn Query (k = 20,δ = 0)
Table 1: Values of n andm for which theTC of QF and FQ are










So far, the plot in Figure 2 and the values in Table 1 correspond
to the best case scenario for QF, i.e., δ = 0. We now explain why a
focus on this case is sufficient.
Let us consider real scenarios such as online social networks like
Orkut and LiveJournal. The number of connections that a person s
has in these networks is the number of persons that have declared
to have a relationship with s , e.g., friend, colleague. This translates
to our authorization model as the size of the view of s . In [13], the
authors found that considering about 3 million nodes, the average
number of connections of a person in Orkut and LiveJournal is
223.99 and 520.04, respectively. In DBLP with 317080 nodes, the
average number of connections is 64.98 [13]. This suggests that the
size of the view of a given person increases monotonically with
the number of persons. Analogously, Table 1 reveals that Viewequal
grows monotonically with the number of persons n. We can also
observe that, ifn=2000,Viewequal is already greater than the average
number of connections for 3 million persons in real scenarios. For n
equal to 3 million, Viewequal=152046. This indicates that the size of
the view of a given person in real scenarios is smaller than Viewequal
for a given n. This implies that FQ performs better than QF even in
the best case scenario of QF. So we do not dwell into the behavior
of QF with restarts.
The analysis of the approaches for range queries can be done in
the same way. Range queries are unbounded result-size queries. QF
for range queries does not need any restart. In the analysis of QF
for kNN queries, we did not consider restarts because we assumed
estimateK to compute kr eal in the first run. Therefore, the skeleton
structure of the complexity analysis is the same for both type of
queries. For these reasons, we omit this part.
5 THE SIZE OF THE VIEW OF A PERSON
In this section, we study the impact of mutual authorizations on
the number of persons whose position a given person s is allowed
to read, i.e., Views . This is important not only from the point of
view of the LBSP but also from the user perspective. A user may
want to know how the use of mutual authorizations compared to
the use of deny or allow in the population affects the number of
persons whose position he is allowed to read.
To study the impact of mutual authorizations on the view of
a person, we derive the probability P(|Views |=N ) that a person s
chosen at random can see the physical position of a specific num-
ber of persons N , given the share of mutual to deny and allow
authorizations in the entire population. To do so, we look at the au-
thorizations after solving all authorization conflicts. This allows us
to represent the authorizations and persons as a so-called authoriza-
tion graphG . Since every person of a pair assigns an authorization
to the other one, at least implicitly, G is a complete digraph.
Definition 5.1 (Authorization Graph). Given a set of authoriza-
tions A , an authorization graphG = (V ,E) is a complete digraph
with labeled directed edges, as follows: The vertices represent the
persons. A directed edge with label grant betweenu andv indicates
that there exists a user-grant tuple ⟨u,дrant⟩ ∈ resC(A,v), where
дrant ∈ Gr .
The number of incoming edges of any node is |Ein | = |V | − 1.
To compute P(|Views | = N ), where N ≤ |Ein |, we need a con-
crete distribution of allow, deny and mutual authorizations. The
arguments behind our analysis hold for any distribution. For the
sake of simplicity, we now assume a uniform distribution of allow,
deny andmutual authorizations, where the numbers of these autho-
rizations are parameters of the distribution, i.e., the probability that
a random chosen authorization has an allow grant is given by the
number of allow authorizations over the total number of authoriza-
tions, for mutual and deny accordingly. To not restrict ourselves to
a specific scenario, we assume that the only information available
is: (i1) the number of nodes in the authorization graph G, |V |, (i2)
the number of deny edges inG , |d |, (i3) the number ofmutual edges
in G, |m |, and (i4) the number of allow edges in G, |a |, such that
|E | = |a | + |m | + |d |.
Example 5.2 illustrates how one can compute the probability that
the size of the view of a random person s is one, i.e., P(|Views | = 1).
Example 5.2. Think of a node s with two incoming and two
outgoing edges. s has a view of size 1 if s has either C1, C2, C3 or
C4, where:
(C1) One allow and one deny incoming edge.
(C2) One allow incoming edge, one mutual incoming edge and
one deny outgoing edge pointing to the node the mutual
incoming edge originates from.
(C3) One mutual incoming edge, one deny incoming edge, and
one mutual or allow outgoing edge pointing to the node the
mutual incoming edge originates from.
(C4) Two mutual incoming edges, one mutual or allow outgoing
edge, and one deny outgoing edge such that the outgoing
edges point to the nodes themutual incoming edges originate
from.
Then, to compute P(|Views | = 1), it suffices to sumup the individual
probabilities of all the above cases.
Example 5.2 shows that the distinction between allow andmutual
outgoing edges is not relevant in cases C2, C3 and C4. Then, to
simplify the computation of P(|Views | = N ) in these cases, we
treat allow and mutual outgoing edges as belonging to one group.
Lemma 5.3 proves the correctness of this simplification.
Lemma 5.3. Let (1) a value r ∈ N, (2) a multisetX = X1∪X2∪X3,
and (3) a multiset Y = Y1 ∪ X3, where X1, X2 and X3, and Y1 and
X3 are pairwise disjoint multisets, their corresponding underlying set
is a unit set, and |Y1 | = |X1 ∪ |X2 |, be given. Let Ar be the event of
choosing r elements from the multisetX such that the chosen elements
belong either to the submultiset X1 or to X2, and let Br be the event of
choosing r elements from the multiset Y such that the chosen elements
belong to the submultiset Y1. Then






Proof. By induction on r . We first prove that Equation (6) is true
for r = 1. Then we assume that Equation (6) holds for r and prove
that it also holds for r + 1. Let us start by proving that Equation (6)
is true for r = 1.
Let a be the chosen element. The probability of choosing 1 ele-
ment, from a multiset of |X | elements such that the chosen element





possible ways to choose 1 element from a multiset
of |X | elements. So:
P(A1) = P(B1)
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Then the claim is valid for r = 1. We still need to prove that
Equation (6) is true for r + 1 assuming it is true for r .
LetC be the event of choosing 1 element that belongs either to the
submultiset X1 or X2 given event Ar . The probability of choosing
r + 1 elements from |X | elements such that the chosen elements
belong either to the submultiset X1 or X2 is equal to the probability
that events Ar and C occur, P(Ar ∩C) = P(Ar ) · P(C |Ar ).Because







Let us discuss now the probability P(C |Ar ). In event Ar , r ele-
ments have been selected already from the total number of elements
|X |. The remaining number of elements is |X | − r . Let x1 and x2
be the number of elements selected from the submultisets X1 and
X2, respectively, where r = x1 + x2. The probability that event C
happens given eventAr is P(C |Ar ) = P(b ∈ X1 |Ar )+P(b ∈ X2 |Ar ),
where b is the chosen element. Given event Ar , the number of
possible ways of choosing one element from the total remaining el-
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We now compute the total number of possible graphs (possible
outcomes) |G| that can be built with |a | allow, |m | mutual and |d |
deny edges. |G| is required to compute P(|Views | = N ).
Lemma 5.4. Given (1) an authorization graph G = (V ,E), (2) |d |
deny edges, (3) |m | mutual edges and (4) |a | allow edges, the number












Proof. Consider an authorization graph G with |V | nodes and





possible ways to assign |a | allow labels to the total
number of edges |E |. Next, there are




assign |m | mutual labels to the remaining edges, |E | − |a |. Finally,
there are
( |E |− |a |− |m |
Td
)
possible ways to assign |d | deny labels to








( |E |− |a |− |m |
|d |
)
. Using the facts that |E | = |a | + |m | + |d |,
and ∀n ∈ N, (nn) = 1, we have |G| = ( |E ||a |) · ( |E |− |a ||m | ) . □
To compute P(|Views | = N ), we now generalize Example 5.2. To
do so, we establish some notions.
Definition 5.5 (Corresponding outgoing edge). Given an incoming
edge of node s coming from u, the corresponding outgoing edge
is the edge of s pointing to u.
Definition 5.6 (Corresponding incoming edge). Given an outgoing
edge of node s pointing to u, the corresponding incoming edge
is the edge of s coming from u.
Notation: Given a node s , (1) Ina is the number of allow incom-
ing edges of s , (2) Inm its number ofmutual incoming edges, (3) Ind
its number of deny incoming edges, (4) Inm1 its number of mutual
incoming edges with a corresponding allow or mutual outgoing
edge, (5) Inm2 its number of mutual incoming edges with a cor-
responding deny outgoing edge, (6) Outam its number of allow or
mutual outgoing edges with a correspondingmutual incoming edge,
(7) Outd its number of deny outgoing edges with a corresponding
mutual incoming edge.
Lemma 5.7. Let |Ein |, Ina , Inm , Ind , Inm1, Inm2, Outam be given.
(1) The number of incoming edges is: |Ein | = Ina + Inm + Ind .
(2) The number of mutual incoming edges is: Inm = Inm1+Inm2.
(3) The number of mutual or allow outgoing edges with corre-
sponding mutual incoming edges is Outam = Inm1.
(4) The number of deny outgoing edges with corresponding mu-
tual incoming edges is Outd = Inm2.
Proof. First, by Definition 5.1, an authorization graph has only
allow, mutual or deny edges. Then, |Ein | = Ina + Inm + Ind .
Second, since Inm1 and Inm2 are mutual incoming edges with
corresponding allow or mutual and deny outgoing edges, it fol-
lows that Inm = Inm1 + Inm2. Third, Outam are allow or mutual
outgoing edges with corresponding mutual incoming edge. Then,
Outam = Inm1. Fifth, Outd are deny outgoing edges with corre-
sponding mutual incoming edges. Then, Outd = Inm2. □
Example 5.8. Consider case C3 of Example 5.2. Using the above
notation,C3 is represented as: Ina = 0, Inm1 = 1, Inm2 = 0 Ind = 1,
Outam = 1, Outd = 0, and Inm = Inm1 + Inm2.
Definition 5.9 (Events). Let a node s , an integer N ≤ |Ein |, Ina ,
Inm , Ind , Inm1, Inm2, Outam , and Outd , such that N = Ina + Inm1,
be given.
• sIna is the event of s having Ina edges.
• sInm is the event of s having Inm edges.
• sInd is the event of s having Ind edges.
• sOutam is the event of s having Outam edges.
• sOutd is the event of s having Outd edges.
Events sIna , sInm , sInd , sOutam and sOutd are what we call dependent
events.
We now compute the individual probabilities of each case in
Example 5.2 in the general case. The general case is the probability
P(sE ) that a node s chosen at random has Ina , Inm , Ind , Outam and
Outd edges. Lemma 5.10 computes P(sE ), i.e., the joint probability
that the dependent events sIna , sInm , sInd , sOutam , sOutd happen.
Lemma 5.10. Let (1) an authorization graph G = (V ,E) with |d |
deny edges, |m | mutual edges, |a | allow edges, (2) an integer N ≤
|Ein |, and the values (3) Ina , Inm , Ind , Outam , and Outd such that
N = Ina + Inm1 be given. The probability P(sE ) that a random node
























( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1
|a |+ |m |−N−Inm1−Inm2
)( |E |− |Ein |
|a |+ |m |−N−Inm2
) ·( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1−Inm2
|d |− |Ein |+N
)( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1
|d |− |Ein |+Inm2+N
) (8)
Proof. The joint probability of sIna , sInm , sInd , sOutam , and
sOutd is P(sE ) = P(sIna )·P(sInm |sIna )·P(sInd |sIna∩sInm )·P(sOutam |
sIna ∩ sInm ∩ sInd ) ·P(sOutd |sIna ∩ sInm ∩ sInd ∩ sOutam ). We divide
the proof in five parts. In the first part we compute the probability of
event sIna . In the second part we compute the probability of event
sInm given event sIna . In the third part we compute the probability
of event sInd given events sIna and sInm . In the fourth part we
compute the probability of event sOutam given events sIna , sInm and
sInd . In the fifth part we compute the probability of event sOutd given
events sIna , sInm , sInd , and sOutam . Let us start by computing the
probability of event sIna . Fist, from the total number of incoming
edges |Ein |, we fix Ina allow edges. We can choose Ina allow edges




possible ways. Second, the
number of possible ways for assigning the remaining allow labels





step, Ta allow edges have been assigned. Third, we assign the |m |
mutual labels. There are
( |E |− |a |
|m |
)
possible ways to assign |m |mutual
labels to the remaining edges |E |−|a |. Finally, there are
( |E |− |a |− |m |
|d |
)
possible ways to assign |d | deny labels to the remaining edges |E | −
|a |− |d |. Using the facts that |E | = |a |+ |m |+ |d |, and ∀n ∈ N, (nn) = 1,( |E |− |a |− |m |
|d |
)
= 1. To this point, we have finished the analysis of the
probability that event sIna happens. Then the probability of event
sIna is given by the number of different graphs where sIna happens
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Let us move now to the computation of the probability that event
sInm happens given event sIna . First, we have already assign Ina
allow incoming edges. Then from the total number of remaining
incoming edges |Ein |−Ina , we fix Inm mutual edges.We can choose
Inm mutual edges from the remaining incoming edges |Ein |−Ina in( |Ein |−Ina
Inm
)
possible ways. Second, the number of possible ways for
assigning the remaining mutual labels |m | − Inm to the remaining,




. After this step,
Tm mutual edges and Ina allow edges have been assigned. Third, we
assign the remaining |a | − Ina allow labels. There are
( |E |−Ina−|m |
|a |−Ina
)
possible ways to assign |a | − Ina allow labels to the remaining, not
yet assigned edges |E | − Ina − |m |. Fourth, there are
( |E |− |a |− |m |
|d |
)
possible ways to assign |d | deny labels to the remaining edges
|E | − |a | − |m |. Finally, the total number of possible graphs that can













Using the facts that |E | = |a | + |m | + |d |, and ∀n ∈ N, (nn) = 1, the
probability that event sInm happens given event sIna is:























( |E |− |a |− |m |
|d |
)
Because of Lemma 5.7 and using the fact that N = Ina + Inm1:










Let us move now to the computation of the probability that event
sInd happens given events sIna and sInm . First, we have already
assign Ina + Inm allow and mutual incoming edges. Then from
the total number of remaining incoming edges |Ein | − Ina − Inm ,
we fix Ind deny edges. We can choose Ind deny edges from the




possible ways. Using the fact that |Ein | = Ina + Inm + Ind and
∀n ∈ N, (nn) = 1, ( |Ein |−Ina−InmInd ) = 1. Second, the number of
possible ways for assigning the remaining deny labels |d | − Ind
to the remaining, not yet assigned edges E − Ina − Inm − Ind is( |E |−Ina−Inm−Ind
|d |−Ind
)
. After this step, Td deny edges and Ina + Inm
allow and mutual edges have been assigned. Third, we assign the
|a | − Ina allow labels. There are




assign |a |−Ina allow labels to the remaining, not yet assigned edges
|E | − Ina − Inm − |d |. Fourth, there are




to assign the remaining mutual labels |m | − Inm to the remaining,
not yet assigned edges |E | − |a | − |d | − Inm . Finally, the total number














fact that |E | = |a | + |m | + |d |, and ∀n ∈ N, (nn) = 1, the probability
that event sInd happens given events sIna and sInm is:
P(sInd |sIna ∩ sInm ) =
































( |E |−Inm−|a |− |d |
|m |−Inm
)
Because of Lemma 5.7 and using the fact that N = Ina + Inm1:
P(sInd |sIna ∩ sInm ) =
( |E |− |Ein |




Let us move now to the computation of the probability that event
sOutam happens given events sIna , sInm and sInd . First, we have
already assigned |Ein | incoming edges and we still have |E | − |Ein |
edges, which are not yet assigned. Since, the Outam outgoing edges
can have either allow or mutual labels and because of Lemma 5.3,
we can consider the allow and mutual labels as one group for this
part of the proof. From the total number of outgoing edges Eout ,
we fix Outam edges labeled either with allow ormutual. The Outam
outgoing edges should be assigned exactly to the nodes that have an
outgoing edge labeled withmutual pointing to the randomly chosen
node. Then the Outam outgoing edges cannot be any outgoing edge
from the |Eout | edges; they have to be exactly the Inm edges that are
pointing to the nodes that have a mutual outgoing edge pointing
to the randomly chosen node. Therefore, we can choose Outam





the number of possible ways for assigning the remaining allow and
mutual labels |a | + |m | − Ina − Inm − Outam to the remaining, not
yet assigned edges |E | − |Ein | −Outam is
( |E |− |Ein |−Outam




( |E |− |a |− |m |−Ind
|d |
)
possible ways to assign |d | − Ind
deny labels to the remaining edges |E | − |a | − |m |. Finally, the
total number of possible graphs that can be built with |E | − |Ein |
edges is
( |E |− |Ein |
|a |+ |m |−Ina−Inm
)
·
( |E |− |a |− |m |−Ind
|d |−Ind
)
. Using the facts that
|E | = |a | + |m | + |d |, and ∀n ∈ N, (nn) = 1, the probability that event
sOutam happens given events sIna , sInm and sInd is:







( |E |− |Ein |−Outam





( |E |− |a |− |m |−Ind
|d |−Ind
)( |E |− |Ein |





( |E |− |a |− |m |−Ind
|d |−Ind
)
Because of Lemma 5.7 and using the fact that N = Ina + Inm1:




( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1
|a |+ |m |−N−Inm1−Inm2
)( |E |− |Ein |
|a |+ |m |−N−Inm2
) (12)
Let us move now to the computation of the probability that
event sOutd happens given events sIna , sInm , sInd and sOutam . First,
we have already assigned |Ein | − Outam edges and we still have
|E |− |Ein |−Outam edges, which are not yet assigned. From the total
number of outgoing edges Eout , we fix Outd deny edges. The Outd
outgoing edges should be assigned exactly to the nodes that have
an outgoing edge labeled with mutual pointing to the randomly
chosen node. Then theOutd outgoing edges cannot be any outgoing
edge from the |Eout | edges; they have to be exactly the Inm edges
that are pointing to the nodes that have a mutual outgoing edge
pointing to the randomly chosen node. Since from the Inm edges,
we have already fixed Outam edges, we can choose Outd edges














= 1. Second, the number of possible ways
for assigning the remaining deny labels |d | − Ind − Outd to the
remaining, not yet assigned edges |E | − |Ein | − Outam − Outd is( |E |− |Ein |−Outam−Outd
|d |−Ind−Outd
)
. Third, there are
( |E |−Ina−Inm−Outam−|d |
|a |+ |m |−Ina−Inm−Outam
)
possible ways to assign |a |+ |m | − Ina − Inm −Outam the remaining
allow and mutual labels to the remaining edges |E | − Ina − Inm −
Outam − |d |. Finally, the total number of possible graphs that can be




·( |E |−Ina−Inm−Outam−|d |
|a |+ |m |−Ina−Inm−Outam
)
. Using the facts that |E | = |a | + |m | + |d |,
and ∀n ∈ N, (nn) = 1, the probability that event sOutd happens given
events sIna , sInm , sInd and sOutam is:













((( |E |−Ina−Inm−Outam−|d |







(((( |E |−Ina−Inm−Outam−|d |
|a |+ |m |−Ina−Inm−Outam
)
Because of Lemma 5.7 and using the fact that N = Ina + Inm1:
P(sOutd |sIna ∩ sInm ∩ sInd ∩ sOutam ) =( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1−Inm2
|d |− |Ein |+N
)( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1
|d |− |Ein |+Inm2+N
) (13)
Finally, using Equations (9) to (13), the probability that a ran-
domly chosen node has (1) Ina allow incoming edges, (2) Inm mu-
tual incoming edges, (3) Ind deny incoming edges, (4) Outam out-
going edges labeled either with allow or mutual, and (5) Outd deny
outgoing edges such that each of the Outam +Outd outgoing edges
are pointing to one of the nodes that have a mutual edge pointing
to the node s , where Ina + Inm + Ind = |Ein | and Outam = Inm1,
























( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1
|a |+ |m |−N−Inm1−Inm2
)( |E |− |Ein |
|a |+ |m |−N−Inm2
) ·( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1−Inm2
|d |− |Ein |+N
)( |E |− |Ein |−Inm1
|d |− |Ein |+Inm2+N
)
□
Given an integer N ≤ |Ein |, Theorem 5.11 yields the probability
P(|Views | = N ). To obtain it, we sum up all the individual cases of
Example 5.2 in the general scenario.
Theorem 5.11. Let (1) an authorization graph G = (V ,E), (2) an
integer N ≤ |Ein |, (3) |d | deny edges, (4) |m | mutual edges and (5) |a |
allow edges be given. The probability P(|Views | = N ) that a node s
chosen at random has a view of size N is:
P(|Views |=N ) =
min{N , |m | }∑
Inm1=0
min{ |Ein |−N , |m | }∑
Inm2=0
P(sE ) (14)
Proof. Given a node s , there are different cases in which the size
of the view of s , |Views |, can be equal to exactly N . One case is that
node s has N incoming edges edges labeled with allow and Ein −N
incoming edges labeled with deny. Another case is that node s has
N incoming edges labeled with allow, Inm2 incoming edges labeled
withmutual, |Ein |−N −Inm2 incoming edges labeled with deny and
Inm2 outgoing edges labeled with deny pointing to the nodes that
assigned the Inm2 mutual incoming edges, where Inm2 ≤ |Ein | −N .
Another case is that node s has N − 1 incoming edges labeled with
allow, one labeled with mutual coming from a node u, Ein − N
incoming edges labeled with deny, and for that mutual incoming
edge, there is an allow or mutual outgoing edge from s to u. Every
time that we decrease one allow incoming edge, we need to increase
(1) onemutual incoming edges and (2) one allow ormutual outgoing
edge, and the remaining incoming edges |Ein | − N have to labeled
with deny. Then, to compute the probability, P(|Views | = N ), we
need to sum up the probabilities of all different cases. We start from
the probability of having N incoming edges labeled with allow
and Ein − N incoming edges labeled with deny i.e., there are no
incoming edges labeled with mutual.Then maintaining the N allow
incoming edges, (1) we increase by one the mutual incoming edges
such that for each mutual incoming edge coming from a node u
there is one deny outgoing edge from node s to node u, and (2)
we set the remaining incoming edges N − Inm2 to be deny. We
repeat this process until we reach to N − Ina mutual incoming
edges and N − Ina deny outgoing edges, while maintaining N allow
incoming edges. Next, from the N incoming edges, we increase
by one the number of mutual incoming edges such that for each
mutual incoming edge coming from a node u there is an allow or
mutual outgoing edges. We finish with the probability of having
|Ein | incoming edges labeled with mutual such that there are Inm1
outgoing edges labeled with allow or mutual and Inm2 outgoing
edges labeled with deny, where Inm1 = N , Inm2 = |Ein | − Inm1
and Inm = |Em1| + Inm2.
Then using Lemma 5.10, we obtain:
P(|Views | = N ) =
min {N , |m | }∑
Inm1=0




Using Theorem 5.11 one can compute the probability that a node
s chosen at random has a view size equal to a given N ≤ |Ein |
depending on the share of mutual to deny and allow authorizations
of the population. This will allow us to study in Section 6.1 how the
changes in the authorizations, i.e., replacements of allow or deny
authorizations with mutual ones, affect the size of the view of s .
6 EXPERIMENTS
This section presents an experimental analysis of the impact of
mutual authorizations on the size of the view of a person, and an
experimental validation of the complexity analysis of QF and FQ.
6.1 Experimental Analysis – Size of the Views
This subsection features two sets of experiments, namedMutual/De-
ny andMutual/Allow. The goal of them is to analyze how the ratios
of mutual to deny and of mutual to allow authorizations, respecti-
vely, affect the probability that a random person can read the posi-
tion of a given number of persons N ≤ |Ein |, i.e., P(|Views | = N ).
6.1.1 Experiment Setup. We create 100 authorization graphs, 50
graphs for each set of experiments. All graphs have |V | = 100 nodes
and |E | = 9900 edges. We construct the graphs of both experiments
by starting with a graph that has 50 percent allow edges, 50 percent
deny edges and 0 percent mutual edges. All the graphs fulfill a
uniform distribution regarding the number of allow, mutual and
deny edge.
For the Mutual/Deny experiments, we then modify the percent-
age of mutual and deny labeled edges by increasing the former
one in steps of 1 while decreasing the later at the same rate. The
percentage of allow-edges remains unchanged. For each setting, we
compute P(|Views | = N ), the probability that a random person can
read the position of exactly N persons. We consider three values
for N , namely N = 60, N = 80, N = |Ein |.
For Mutual/Deny experiments, instead of decreasing the share
of deny-edges, we decrease the one of allow-edges.
6.1.2 Results. Figure 3(a) for the Mutual/Deny experiments and
Figure 4(a) for the Mutual/Allow experiments show the probability
that a node s chosen at random can read the position of N persons,
P(|Views | = N ), contingent on the percentage of mutual and deny
authorizations. Figure 3(b) and Figure 4(b) are semi-log plots cor-
responding to Figure 3(a) and Figure 4(a), respectively, which give
more emphasis to smaller probabilities.
Discussion: Depending on the size of the view, the impact of
changing deny to mutual is different. We can observe in Figure 3(b)
that, for larger views, the impact of replacing deny authorizations
with mutual ones is higher as well. For instance, if 5 percent of
deny authorizations are replaced by mutual ones, the probability
P(|Views | = |Ein |), increases by a factor of 1000. For probability
P(|Views | = 60) in turn increase is by a factor of 1.3. However, if
one is interested in a high probability of having a view of a specific
size, say a 80% chance, the results depend on the target size of the
view. If the target size of the view is smaller, it is needed to replace a
smaller percentage of deny authorizations by mutual ones in order
to reach this probability. For instance, the probability P(|Views | =
60), given 50 percent of allow and 50 percent of deny authorizations,
is ≈ 0.021. If only 20 percent of deny authorizations are replaced
by mutual ones, this probability increases to 0.8. Consider now the
probability P(|Views | = |Ein |. Then, if we want this probability
to increase to 0.8, it is necessary to replace 49.5 percent of deny
authorizations by mutual ones, i.e., almost all deny authorizations
should be replaced. As the percentage of mutual-edges increases
and the percentage of allow-edges decreases in the same proportion,
we can observe in Figure 4(b) that, for larger views, the impact
of replacing deny authorizations with allow ones is higher. For
instance, if 5 percent of deny authorizations are replaced by mutual
ones, the probability P(|Views | = |Ein |) decreases by a factor of
100, whereas the probability P(|Views | = 60) decreases by a factor
of 3.6. Then the decrease of these probabilities depends on the size
of the view that one is interested in.
Fig. 3: P(|Views | = N ) - Mutual/Deny experiments
Fig. 4: P(|Views | = N ) - Mutual/Allow experiments
6.2 Experimental Validation of the Complexity
Analysis of QF and FQ
Our complexity analysis of QF and FQ in Section 4 already allows
us to compare both approaches. However, since that analysis covers
the worst case, experimental results are needed (1) as validation and
(2) to determine how far the worst case deviates from the concrete
behavior of individual queries. To implement the QF approach,
we use the R-tree index structure from Oracle, and the remaining
implementation was done in Java.
6.2.1 Experiment Setup. In Section 4, we have found, based on the
complexity analysis, that the parameters that affect the performance
of FQ and QF are (1) the number of personsn, (2) the size of the view
|Views | of a given person s , (3) the parameter k of the kNN query
and (4) the value δ = kr eal −k . Similarly to the complexity analysis,
for simplicity, we set δ to 0 and k to 20. We set the remaining
parameters, n and |Views |, as follows:
Number of persons n: We create a dataset with 317080 persons.
This number is the size of the DBLP dataset. To assign a position to
each person, we choose a random physical position from the Tokyo
dataset [27], which contains 573703 real check-ins, i.e., positions.
Size of the view of a person s , |Views |, and query sample:We chose
1500 persons at random from the 317080 persons and assigned the
authorizations so that we have 15 classes of different sized views
(from 50 to 40000). For each class, we have 100 persons with the
respective view size, i.e., 1500 queries in 15 different classes in total.
6.2.2 Experiment Results. Figure 5 shows a comparison of the
query-processing times for kNN queries with QF and FQ. We have
grouped the persons of our query sample by the size of their
view and have plotted the query-processing time. We exclude the
database-connection time and network-communication time from
the run time reported. The dotted line is the average size of the
view in DBLP with 317080 nodes, i.e., 64.98, [13]. The dashed line
in Figure 5(c) is the size of the view for which the performance of
both approaches is equal, i.e., Viewequal ≈ 23032, 3.
Discussion. For real scenarios, i.e., the size of the view is equal to
64.98, FQ performs better than QF for all queries. These results are
in line with our complexity analysis, and one may interpret them as
an indication that our analysis also holds for the average case. Next,
these findings remain correct for a size of the view of up to 800,
which is higher than the highest average size of the view in real
scenarios, i.e., 520 (Section 4). However, as Figure 5(b) shows, with
a view size between 1000 up to 20000, the processing times of most
of the queries with QF are lower than that of the ones with FQ, in
contrast to our complexity analysis. This can be expected since our
analysis has focused on the worst case. In Figure 5(c), we observe
that the processing times of most of the queries with QF, or all the
queries in the case of the last two groups, i.e., 35000 and 40000, are
lower than that of the ones with FQ. These results indicate that for
a size of the view greater than the value Viewequal (dashed line)
our complexity analysis holds even for the average case.
7 MUTUAL AUTHORIZATIONS
FOR OTHER RESOURCES
In this paper, we have restricted our model to one type of resource,
physical positions. We now describe the steps necessary to facilitate
mutual authorizations for other domains, e.g., health records.
(1) One must define a scale for the sensitivity of different re-
sources, so that exchanges can be fair.
(2) One must specify the degree of sensitivity of each resource
and/or an entity responsible for assigning such a degree to
each resource., e.g., its owner or a global authority. This may
be intricate, cf. Example 1.8. Next, it must be the case that
participants agree with these specifications. For instance, if
I find my health record much more precious than yours and
vice versa, our approach does not cover this.
(3) One has to define (1) the services that the system will sup-
port and (2) the integration of access control with these
services. For instance, think of the information need that I
want to see the 10 health records most similar to mine. In
this case, it is needed a notion of distance, together with an
implementation.
(4) It remains just to adjust Definition 2.6 of mutual authoriza-
tion. One has to specify that resources with the same degree
of sensitivity can be exchanged.
8 RELATEDWORK
Several access control models have been proposed, like RBAC [20],
Task RBAC [16] and Attribute-based Access Control [29]. The dif-
ference to ours is that they only consider the grants deny and allow.
These two grants are not enough to capture mutual authorizations.
Besides access control models, encryption techniques have also
been studied to achieve data confidentiality [3, 26]. The main idea is
to encrypt the resources and to enforce access control with the de-
cryption keys assigned to the users. The approach in [26] encrypts
the data with different keys, depending on the authorizations to be
enforced. After encryption, the decryption keys are given to users
based on their access privileges. In [3], the data is encrypted to-
gether with an access structure, which represents a set of attributes
together with values which users must have in order to access the
data. The decryption key given to the users is generated based
on their attribute values. Users can decrypt a ciphertext c if their
decryption key matches the attribute values of the access structure
associated with c . This work does not consider mutual access to
resources. This is because the decryption keys are generated and
distributed without considering reciprocity.
There is other work that focuses on formalizing and verifying
the authorization constraints in RBAC and its extensions. These
proposals use Colored Petri-Nets [21] or the Unified Modeling Lan-
guage UML [18]. They focus on (1) introducing formal techniques
to verify the design and consistency of authorizations on RBAC
models, i.e., model checking, and on (2) providing a graphical rep-
resentation of the authorizations, as visualizations. This work is
confined to allow and deny authorizations as well. This is because
it is based on access control models existing at that time. Next, our
authorization graph can be seen as a graphical representation of
authorizations in our model.
Fig. 5: Comparison of the QF and FQ approaches for kNN queries
9 CONCLUSIONS
Reciprocity is a powerful determinant of human behavior. However,
none of the existing access control models explicitly supports it. In
this paper, we have proposed a new type of authorization, called
mutual. It allows users to grant access to their resources to users
that allow them the same. We have extended RBAC to incorporate
mutual authorizations and have formally defined their syntax and
semantics. Since the result of a given service in the presence of
mutual authorizations is not obvious, we have studied this as well.
To do so, we have selected LBSs as a use case for the deployment
of mutual authorizations, and we have proposed two approaches.
A complexity analysis tells us when each approach is better. We
have validated the results of our analysis experimentally. Further,
we have studied how the difference in the ratio of mutual to deny
and allow authorizations affects the size of the view of a given user.
In the future, it will be interesting to study how to apply encryp-
tion techniques to achieve data secrecy and confidentiality, and
generate and distribute the encryption-decryption keys in a recip-
rocal manner. Another direction is to explore how to incorporate
mutual authorizations into existing model-checking techniques like
[18, 21]. Yet another direction is to extend mutual authorizations by
considering different resources with more than one controller, i.e.,
users who can regulate access to the resource, and with different
levels of sensitivity.
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